Contradictory Testimony No Basis for Denial Of Summary Judgment

All too often, a defendant in a toxic tort case loses a motion for summary judgment because the court determines that imprecise witness testimony creates a triable issue of fact that warrants denial of the motion. Indeed, it is the rule in California that the task of deciphering the meaning of “ambiguous” witness testimony is a role reserved for the jury. Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 541, 113 Cal.Rptr. 3d 327, 235 P.3d.988

Thus, quoting from this oft-cited case, plaintiffs routinely argue that “the task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary judgment.” Other California holdings suggest that an inconsistency in witness testimony does not require that the testimony be disregarded in its entirety; rather, it is for the trier of fact to determine what weight the testimony should be given. Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865.

On May 4, 2012, the Bloomberg BNA Toxic Law Reporter reported on the recent  decision in Davis v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., Cal. Ct. App., No. B226089, 4/26/12, where the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District drew a sharp distinction between testimony that was “ambiguous” and testimony that was “internally contradictory.”  In affirming summary judgment, the court found that no triable issue of fact was established where the witness testimony was contradictory. Here are the pertinent facts.

Ronald Davis worked at a chemical plant in Torrance, California in the 1960’s. He later developed mesothelioma, and died in 2009. Among others, the plaintiff sued Foster Wheeler, alleging negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium. Foster Wheeler moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not manufacture, sell, or distribute any asbestos-containing product, and that the decedent was not exposed to asbestos dust by any Foster Wheeler product. The trial court granted summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed.

The plaintiffs argued that there was a triable issue concerning whether Davis was exposed to asbestos dust when Foster Wheeler employees, such a decedent, stripped old asbestos-containing insulation from the outside of boilers during maintenance activity. Key to the plaintiffs’ appeal was the deposition of Claude Chabot, a witness who initially claimed that he observed a maintenance worker stripping insulation wearing a hat with “FW” on the brim. However, in a later deposition, Mr. Chabot testified that he had no information whether any Foster Wheeler personnel removed or installed insulation on the boilers at the plant.

Under these circumstances, the trial court decided that “no reasonable jury considering this opposing testimony would conclude that the [Foster Wheeler] workers are the workers who removed the asbestos insulation around the Foster Wheeler boiler.” The appeals court agreed that Mr. Chabot’s internally contradictory testimony did not establish the existence of a triable issue of fact.

I have not examined whether other jurisdictions draw a similar distinction between “ambiguous” and “contradictory” or “internally inconsistent” testimony, but if they do not, perhaps they should. In many toxic tort cases, defense counsel may be confronted with potentially adverse testimony from a witness who is testifying to recollections that may be decades old. (Did the witness see that FW hat at the plant or at a UCLA football game?)

One school of thought is to leave adverse testimony alone. Pursuant to this view, taking an expanded deposition of plaintiff’s witness would only make the “record” worse. The holding in Davis suggests that this view may be shortsighted. The adverse witness who provides an affidavit to plaintiff’s counsel may be doing so out of sympathy for a co-worker who has died or suffers from a serious illness. A witness’s recollection of events is often different when the witness is deposed, possibly on videotape, in a formal deposition setting. It is possible that the witness, who provided the unhelpful affidavit, may be willing to admit in deposition that his recollection of long past events may be faulty or possibly inaccurate.

Eliciting contradictory testimony from a witness may not necessarily mean that the witness is dishonest or hostile. Rather, it reflects the tendency in all of us to want to be helpful. Foster Wheeler’s counsel skillfully developed inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony and thereby obtained dismissal from the case. There is no reason why “inconsistent” or “internally contradictory” testimony from witnesses, perhaps originally adverse, should not be disregarded by trial courts in other jurisdictions besides California.
 

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