Toxic Tort Plaintiff’s Feet Held To Fire On Causation Evidence In New York

New York’s appellate courts continue to hold toxic tort plaintiffs and their experts to rigorous standards when it comes to proof of causation. To escape an adverse summary judgment ruling, it is not enough for a plaintiff to merely allege, with the support of an expert, that she was exposed to a toxic substance, and that this exposure resulted in the illness alleged. Rather, the plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to her “exposure to a specific toxin or allergen; quantify the level of exposure to some degree; and posit that such level of exposure was sufficient to produce the alleged injuries.” Such was the holding of the Appellate Division, First Department, in Cleghorne v. City of New York, (2012 NY Slip Op 06648), decided on October 4, 2012.

Cleghorne was a school teacher employed by the New York City Board of Education. She claims that after her school was relocated to the Bronx in 2000, she developed respiratory problems while cleaning her classroom at the new location. Thereafter, she was diagnosed with asthma and bronchitis. After returning to work about a month later, she had an asthma attack at the school and was hospitalized. At her General Municipal Law § 50-h examination in September 2001, Cleghorne testified that she developed a persistent cough while cleaning her classroom and a storage area in the new building and that afterward her condition deteriorated. In October 2001, she commenced an action against the Board of Education and others.

 In 2010, both sides moved for summary judgment. Each side presented their own experts’ medical affidavits. The defendants’ physician, Jack J. Adler, a pulmonologist, determined that plaintiff had developed asthma prior to moving to the new school location. Adler opined that the environmental contaminants at the school did not cause the condition. He reported that plaintiff suffered from atopic or allergic asthma and that she was allergic to several common allergens, including tree and ragweed pollen, dust mites, dogs, cats, cockroaches, mold, spores and mouse and rat antigens, none of which were exclusive to her school. Because these environmental contaminants are extremely prevalent, Dr. Adler opined that she would have similar symptoms in any urban environment.

Cleghorne stated in her affidavit (which the court noted was executed more than nine years after the relevant events) that the school premises “were replete with rodents, rodent carcases, rodent droppings, cobwebs, cockroaches, cockroach and other bug carcasses, mildew, thick-black dust, and excessive dirt, and had numerous ceiling tiles that were water damaged and broken.” In addition, mold was in the ceiling tiles by the vents, on the walls, and in the closets. Her daily routine was to clean out all of this material before starting class.

Based upon Cleghorne’s affidavit, her expert, Dr. Hugh Cassiere, opined that Cleghorne was exposed to a “high level” of daily inhalation of these allergens, which caused her to develop “airway hyperresponsiveness.” Faced with two sets of dueling summary judgment motions, the trial court determined that questions of fact required the denial of both motions.

 In its opinion, the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously reversed, holding that the trial court should have dismissed plaintiff’s case. Relying on the Court of Appeals landmark case, Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., the First Department held that Cleghorne had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the specific toxin or allergen; that she had failed to quantify the level of exposure; and that she had failed to posit (through her expert) that such level of exposure was sufficient to produce the alleged injury.

In pertinent part, the Court held,

"While Parker recognizes that the level of exposure need not always be quantified “precisely,” it is still necessary that “whatever methods an expert uses to establish causation [they be] generally accepted in the [medical] community”… such methods include “mathematical modeling or comparing plaintiff’s exposure level to those of study subjects whose exposure levels were precisely determined."

In Cleghorne, the court found that the only so-called “method” plaintiff’s expert used to establish specific causation was to “accept, at face value, the anecdotal allegations of plaintiff’s uncorroborated affidavit that she was exposes to dust, bugs, rodent droppings and carcases in unspecified quantities and began experiencing asthma, purportedly for the first time, as a result.”
Although plaintiff’s expert characterized  Cleghorne’s exposure as “high level,” the Court found that this assessment was an insufficient basis for his causation theory and that plaintiff’s use of the term “replete” in her affidavit was a “meaningless and vague quantifying adjective.”

Significantly, the court held that an expert’s calculation of the level of exposure may not be based upon assumptions not supported by the record and faulted the plaintiff’s expert for not providing any scientific measurement or employing any accepted method of extrapolating such a measurement. Moreover, plaintiff offered no other evidence concerning the “level of allergens or toxins present in the school.” Although Dr. Cassiere did cite six studies in support of his theory of causation, he failed to compare plaintiff’s exposure level to those of any of the study subjects.

What lessons does Cleghorne provide?

1. Although New York state trial courts are generally reluctant to dismiss the personal injury claim of a sympathetic plaintiff, there is strong precedent in the appellate courts that favors dismissal of toxic tort lawsuits without appropriate scientific support. Therefore, making a strong appellate record below, either on summary judgment or at trial, is essential for achieving a successful outcome;

2. Although some commentators are critical of the Frye rule in New York state court (preferring instead the federal Daubert rule), New York has developed some rigorous Frye jurisprudence. Therefore, all is not lost if you are in New York state court and seek to exclude plaintiff’s expert;

 3. A rigorous analysis of plaintiff’s expert’s opinions, expressed either in his affidavit or CPLR 3101(d) expert witness disclosure, is essential. As reflected in Cleghorne, plaintiff’s expert must be able to quantify the level of exposure albeit not “precisely.” However, plaintiff’s methodology must include “mathematical modeling” or, alternatively, a comparison of plaintiff’s exposure level to the exposure level of study subjects in the scientific studies cited by the expert in support of his theory of causation. It is not sufficient to use words like “replete” or “daily” in quantifying an exposure to a toxin or allergen; and

4. The trial court should be cautioned that, in opposing a motion for summary judgment, it is not sufficient for plaintiff’s expert to rely solely on plaintiff’s "anecdotal" remarks seeking to link cause and injury.

 

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