St. Louis Jurisdiction Determined As of Now, Not At Time of Exposure Decades Ago

A St. Louis court recently granted a defense motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, which may signal an increased willingness to decline to impose jurisdiction over foreign corporations that do no currently conduct business in Missouri. The court’s analysis measured the corporation’s contacts at the present time, not at the time of exposure decades ago. This ruling is in opposition of the trend of allowing plaintiffs to forum shop in the 22nd Judicial Circuit in the City of St. Louis, which has quadrupled its asbestos-related lawsuits since 2010 and is now the fourth largest asbestos docket in the country.

In McGill v. Conwed, plaintiff allegedly sustained occupational exposure to asbestos while working as a laborer and carpenter in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Missouri from 1966 to 1976. During his deposition, plaintiff testified that his work with Conwed ceiling tiles occurred within Kansas. Conwed is not incorporated or principally located in Missouri. Conwed ceased manufacturing ceiling tiles in 1985.

As a result, Conwed moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Conwed argued that Missouri lacks specific jurisdiction because the claim does not arise out of any conduct within Missouri. Conwed argued that the court lacked general jurisdiction because Conwed ceased manufacturing operations in Missouri in 1985; has not conducted business in Missouri since that time; is not registered to do business in Missouri; has no subsidiary in Missouri; does not have a registered agent in Missouri; and does not own property or advertise in Missouri.

Conwed bolstered its argument with another recent St. Louis case, Smith v. Union Carbide, in which the court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by DuPont, a company with greater contacts to Missouri. In that case, the claim emanated from alleged exposure to DuPont in Oklahoma, therefore defeating specific jurisdiction. While DuPont was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business in Missouri, it had a subsidiary and registered agent in Missouri. Nonetheless, DuPont’s lack of incorporation and principal place of business in Missouri was sufficient for the court to decline to exert general personal jurisdiction.

On January 19, 2017, Judge Joan Moriarty, one of two primary asbestos judges in St. Louis, granted Conwed’s motion to dismiss. Judge Moriarty agreed that no basis existed to assert special jurisdiction because the claim against Conwed did not arise out of exposure to any Conwed product or service in Missouri. Further, Judge Moriarty declined to exert general jurisdiction over Conwed, stating that “Conwed undeniably would have been amenable to suit in Missouri prior to 1985, when it did regular and systematic business in Missouri. But now it has no business in Missouri, and has not for over 30 years.” Because Conwed did not currently have systemic, continuous, and substantial connections with Missouri, there was no general personal jurisdiction. Notably, the court reached its decision without mentioning the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the controlling decision on personal jurisdiction.

This ruling has positive ramifications for out-of-state defendants litigating asbestos products liability claims in St. Louis. As Judge Moriarty is one of only two asbestos judges presiding in St. Louis, it can be expected that the decision in McGill v. Conwed will result in an increase in the amount of out-of-state defendants (particularly those who are not currently registered to do business in Missouri) filing and winning personal jurisdiction motions.

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