Lawyers’ Use Of Internet To Influence Jurors

In an earlier article, we discussed the danger posed to an impartial jury system by the “Googling Juror.” In his article titled “Lawyers’ Use of Internet to Influence Jurors” (New York Law Journal, 6/12/12), Michael Hoenig cautions that “the danger to fair trials posed by Internet-surfing jurors is exacerbated by lawyer ‘advertising’ of their prowess or success on websites, by publishing case-specific information on firm sites or blogs or other Internet outlets, and by skillfully weaving inaccurate, misleading or self-serving messages, and ‘depositing’ them where straying jurors can ‘find’ them.” 

Hoenig concludes that these can be purposeful stratagems or innocent puffing. He points out that despite First Amendment protections, courts can and should restrict prejudicial speech by attorneys. real estate ligation in Nashville cautions that lawyers must be diligent in reviewing whether their adversaries (or agents) might be depositing messages about case facts or party litigants, or extraneous, non-admissible information on websites, blogs or other internet locations with the expectation that a straying juror would find the information. Even if the specific facts of a case at trial are not discussed, prospective or sitting jurors can still peruse the attorney’s website, noting biographical information, the firm’s specialties, featured clients and the “war stories,” crusades or victories many firms describe. Hoenig believes that this information likely will be passed to other jurors.

Lawyers do have First Amendment rights to a wide range of speech but they are also subject to reasonable restrictions as officers of the court. Further, lawyers are bound by ethical rules. Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from making an “extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.” Rule 8.4 prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” and also states, “a lawyer or law firm shall not: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce to do so, or do so through the acts of another.”   The article discusses the facts of some of the cases that are emerging in this important area of the law

Thus, it is essential that trial counsel perform their own internet investigation concerning both the subject matter of their upcoming trials, and their adversaries’ internet materials, to determine whether prejudicial information available to prospective jurors has been posted.

 

Courts Reject “Single Fiber” Theory Of Asbestos Causation

A Sixth Circuit case, Moeller v. Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC, 2011 U.S.App.Lexis 19987 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011), is the most recent in a series of judicial decisions that have rejected the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts in asbestos cases who espouse the “any exposure” or “any fiber” or “single fiber” theory of causation.  Pursuant to this specious line of reasoning, asbestos disease is a cumulative dose response process. Each and every exposure to asbestos during a person’s lifetime, no matter how small or trivial – even a single fiber – substantially contributes to the disease, whether it be asbestosis, lung cancer or mesothelioma. Using this theory of causation, plaintiffs have initiated a wave of new lawsuits against defendants far removed from the production of asbestos containing products.  As defense practitioners are well aware, successfully challenging weak causation expert opinions is key to winning any toxic exposure case, whether it involves asbestos or some other substance.

In a “must read” column in the New York Law Journal, dated October 19, 2011 titled "Courts Shoot Down Asbestos Causation Theory", Michael Hoenig, whose law firm defends asbestos case litigation, describes how plaintiff experts are promoting the “any fiber” or “any exposure” theory in courtrooms across the country and how a series of notable judicial decisions have begun to reject these theories as the underlying scientific methodology is subjected to scrutiny. In a recent amicus curiae brief filed by eleven distinguished scientists in a Pennsylvania asbestos case, none of whom received funding from or testified as experts for any of the parties in the case, the scientists attacked the methodological errors of the “any exposure” expert for:  (1) failing to consider the dose level of exposure and minimum threshold of asbestos fiber levels; (2) failing to consider the physical chemical and toxicological differences between various types of asbestos; (3) failing to distinguish between general causation and specific causation (and not even establishing general causation for chrysotile asbestos); (4) for suggesting that “every exposure” and “cumulative risk” theories are generally accepted when they are not; and (5) ignoring the large body of toxicological studies demonstrating that chrysotile asbestos is not potent as a cancer-causing agent. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed in Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 943 A.2d, 216, 223 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2007), that although it was “common for plaintiffs to submit expert affidavits attesting that any exposure to asbestos, no matter how minimal, is a substantial contributing factor in asbestos disease,” such opinions are not “not couched within accepted scientific methodology.”  The court called the “willingness on the part of some experts” to offer such opinions “one of the difficulties” courts face in the mass tort cases.

As the plaintiff bar continues to look further and further afield in its “endless search for a solvent bystander,” as one well-known plaintiff’s lawyer described the litigation, successful challenges under Daubert and Frye should only increase.  The author thanks Mr. Hoenig for his thoughtful treatment of this important topic.

From a risk management perspective, peripheral toxic tort defendants often decline to mount  Daubert challenges due to the cost and time involved and the uncertainty of the result, particularly when the plaintiff presents them with seemingly  reasonable settlement demands.  As a result, hundreds of peripheral defendants continue to be named in these cases and often pay their "penny in tribute" just to get out of the case.  Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions, judges responsible for large asbestos dockets are unwilling to give appropriate consideration to motions by "shade tree" defendants who might otherwise challenge plaintiffs’ experts’  theories of causation.  Cynically, these judges know that the cases will most likely settle out if this type of motion is given short shrift.  There is little incentive for a peripheral defendant to risk an adverse  judgment at trial merely to earn the right to bring an appeal, no matter how strong the grounds may be.  Hopefully, cases like Moeller will have a trickle down effect and motivate the trial judges responsible for the asbestos dockets to re-think their approach. 

Expert Reports Ghostwritten By Counsel

Over the years, I have become an enormous fan of Michael Hoenig, a partner at Herzfeld & Rubin, who writes the Products Liability column in The New York Law Journal. More than any other product liability commentator, Mr. Hoenig has served as a muse and inspiration. His columns are thoughtful and well-written. 

Mr. Hoenig’s column titled, “When Attorneys Ghostwrite Experts’ Reports,” published December 14, 2009, is a case in point. Shortly after the column appeared, I prepared a motion for filing in the EDNY to disqualify an adversary’s expert after he confessed in deposition to not preparing his own expert report. In his article,  Mr. Hoenig poses the following questions: How much attorney involvement in the drafting of experts’ reports is permissible? Must the entire work product be that of the expert? Or, at the other extreme, would it be acceptable for an attorney to draft the entire expert’s report with the expert “adopting” it? And, if at least some lawyer input is tolerable, then what is the boundary line between permission and perdition? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) calls for disclosure of experts retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony and which “must be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness.” Mr. Hoenig discusses the federal district court case law discussing the circumstances under which an expert’s failure to prepare his own report might lead to his being barred from testifying at trial. In evaluating the individual facts presented to determine Rule 26 compliance, courts will most likely base their decisions not on who actually penned the report but, rather, whose opinions and analysis the report contains. One federal district court has held that “substantial participation” by the expert in the preparation of the report is required. Even if your motion to disqualify the expert altogether does not succeed, if you can demonstrate to the trial court that much of the expert’s report was ghostwritten by your adversary, the court may be more kindly disposed to your Daubert arguments. After all, if the expert cannot be bothered to write his own report, how painstaking can his methodology be?