California Limits Take-Home Claims and Affirms That “Substantial Factor” Means More than “Possible”

A California appellate court has sided with the defendants in an alleged take-home asbestos exposure case. Petitpas v. Ford Motor Company (July 5, 2017, B245027) —Cal.App.5th—presents many strong arguments for defendants, including what is required to show that an asbestos product was a substantial factor in causing asbestos disease.

Plaintiffs Joseph and Marline Petitpas alleged that Joseph Petitpas’ work at a gas station owned by Exxon and at various construction sites brought home asbestos which injured Ms. Petitpas.

I.  Take Home Exposures – Duty Not Extended

While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kesner v. Sup. Ct. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132. Kesner allowed take home cases to be brought in California. However, it limited those cases to household members, reasoning that “persons who live with the worker and are thus foreseeably in close and sustained contact with the worker over a significant period of time” are protected. (Id. at 1154-1155.) In Kesner, the injured person was the nephew of a worker who lived for periods of time with his uncle, who manufactured brake linings. In Petipas, Plaintiffs conceded that the parties did not live together when Mr. Petitpas worked at the Exxon station (they were married later). The court in Petipas declined Plaintiffs’ invitation to extend the duty in take home cases to non-household members. “Inviting a trial to determine whether a non-household member’s contact with the employee was ‘similar to the status of a household member’ appears to be exactly what the Supreme Court was attempting to avoid with this bright-line rule.”

II.  Substantial Factor – Probable vs. Possible

To meet their burden in an asbestos case, plaintiffs must show that there is exposure to a defendant’s product that was “in reasonable medical probability” a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 982.) Many factors are considered to determine if the exposures are substantial factors, including frequency, proximity and duration of the exposures. The evidence in this case merely suggested it was possible that Mr. Petitpas brought asbestos dust home on his clothing from his inspection of construction jobs. He only did this for an hour a day and returned to his office for the remainder. Neither Plaintiff testified that Ms. Petitpas shook out his clothes when washing them. Further, it was merely possible she was exposed when visiting the construction sites, because there was no active construction occurring and there was no visible dust. Mere presence of asbestos at a site was simply not sufficient to show that asbestos-containing products used at these sites was a substantial factor in causing Ms. Petitpas’ mesothelioma.

III.  Replacement Parts Doctrine – Applies to Defect as Well as Failure to Warn Claims

Ford submitted a jury instruction which stated that it was not liable for exposure to replacement brakes, clutches and gaskets on Ford vehiclesthat were manufactured by parties other than Ford. This instruction was based upon O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335. The O’Neil decision established that a product manufacturer cannot be held liable in strict liability or negligence for harm caused by another manufacturer’s product “unless the defendant’s own product contributed substantially to the harm, or the defendant participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use of the products.” Plaintiffs objected that O’Neil only applied to failure to warn cases, and that Ford’s design was defective because “it is a Ford design that called for the installation and inclusion of asbestos-containing brake products, whether or not they were made by Ford or anyone else.” The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument because they did not present any evidence that the Ford cars were unable to use non-asbestos parts or were somehow incompatible with non-asbestos parts.

IV.  Jury Instructions in Asbestos Cases

Plaintiffs also argued that the trial court committed error by allowing jury instructions CACI Nos. 430 and 435 to be read to the jury. Both of these instructions give the jury direction on what a “substantial factor” is under California law.  CACI No. 430, the generally applicable instruction, defines “substantial factor” as a factor that “contributed to the harm.” This Use Notes for this instruction state that it should not be read in asbestos related cancer cases.  However, Exxon argued that CACI No. 430 was applicable to it because it was a premises liability defendant, not a product manufacturer or supplier. CACI No. 435 is the instruction for asbestos cancer cases.

CACI No. 435, applicable in asbestos cases only, defines “substantial factor” as one that “contributed to the risk,” not just the harm. Plaintiffs argued that using CACI No. 430 confused the jury and imposed a greater burden on them.

The court allowed both instructions to be read. “That the Use Notes caution against giving the more general CACI No. 430 in a mesothelioma case, when the more specific instruction CACI No. 435 is more applicable, does not support a conclusion that it was error to give both instructions. CACI No. 430 is a correct statement of the law relating to substantial factor causation, even though, as Rutherford noted, more specific instructions also must be given in a mesothelioma case.”

V.  No Studies Show Take-Home Hazards from Brake Repair

The jury found that Exxon did not know, and should not have reasonably known, that Mr. Petitpas’ work at the gas station put Ms. Petitpas at unreasonable risk.

Plaintiffs argued that because the management at Exxon refineries knew about the hazards of asbestos, their agents at service stations also knew. The court did not agree with this argument. Since the jury only heard evidence that conditions at other locations posed a risk to other classes of employees (which Exxon knew about), the jury properly found that Exxon did not know about the risks at its service stations.

The Petitpas court went so far as to suggest that had the jury found otherwise, it would have to be reversed. Dr. Castleman admitted that there were no studies “of any statistical power…that speak of the mesothelioma risk of mechanics that do brake repair work” and that no such studies exist today. Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Horn also conceded this fact. Therefore, the court reasoned, “There was no evidence linking asbestos exposure to occasional bystanders who were near automotive workers as they did brake work.” The court’s conclusion in Petitpas can and should be used as an argument in all brake take-home repair cases.

This decision bodes well for defendants challenging plaintiffs’ often broad and sweeping allegations in asbestos cases.

Colorado Marijuana Distributor Wins Battle in “First of Its Kind” Pesticide Exposure Lawsuit, But Is the War Just Beginning?

One of Colorado’s largest marijuana distributors and growers, LivWell, Inc., successfully moved to dismiss a “first of its kind” class action lawsuit brought against it for the use of an allegedly harmful petroleum-based fungicide on its marijuana crops. The decision, while favorable to the defense, may also have provided a roadmap for similar suits in the future.

Plaintiffs Lack Standing, Court Finds

Plaintiffs and putative class representatives Brandon Flores andmyclobutanil Brandie Larrabee claimed the pesticide, which contains the active ingredient myclobutanil, emits potentially harmful hydrogen cyanide gas when the marijuana is burned. However, the lawsuit never alleged physical, toxic injury. Instead, plaintiffs asserted causes of action for economic injury (including breach of contract, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty claims), alleging only that they overpaid for the marijuana in light of its “contamination” with myclobutanil.

In issuing its order dismissing the case, the court engaged in a straightforward standing analysis under Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo. 1977), which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate both that (1) he suffered an injury in fact, and (2) his injury was to a legally protected interest. The court found that:

[p]laintiffs’ sole stated injury is that they overpaid for defendant’s product. There are no allegations that the product did not perform as it was supposed to, and indeed the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs consumed the product. . .  [n]or are there any allegations that Plaintiffs suffered physical or emotional injury. (citations omitted)

Citing various cases that a claim of diminished value does not state an injury in fact, including Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D. Mass 2009) and Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 283 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2002), the court found unavailing authorities cited by plaintiffs because there was no possibility of reselling the marijuana plaintiffs purchased.  As such, the court found that plaintiffs suffered no injury in fact and dismissed the case. Notably, the decision does not represent a substantive finding that the fungicide at issue was safe for human consumption.

A Roadmap for Future Toxic Injury Litigation?

The LivWell suit was dismissed because of a “legal technicality:” plaintiffs lacked standing to proceed in the absence of a legally cognizable injury in fact. However, in so ruling, the court may very well have unwittingly supplied a roadmap for future lawsuits. The court’s explicit statement that plaintiffs made no allegations of physical injury suggests that such an allegation would have been sufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement and would have allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their lawsuit. Thus, future plaintiffs can cure this defect merely by pleading actual injury.

The Bigger Picture

This case highlights a growing area of concern for state governments, and industry participants, involving consumer safety surrounding the use of legalized use of cannabis.

With numerous states cannabisnow allowing marijuana to be legally sold for medical and/or recreational use, individual state regulations are struggling to keep up. For example, in California, the Department of Pesticide Regulation has published a bulletin called “Pesticide Use on Marijuana,” which states that there are no pesticides registered for use on marijuana and the use of pesticides on marijuana plants has not been reviewed for safety and human health effects. In fact, the only pesticide products not illegal on marijuana are those that contain labels with active ingredients exempt from residue-tolerance requirements and registered for use that is broad enough to include use on marijuana plants. The pesticide at issue in the Colorado case was approved for use on certain foods such as grapes, but banned for use on tobacco, creating confusion for those who are in need for products that control pests on their growing crops.

In 2013, the Journal of Toxicology published an article which attempted to quantify to what extent cannabis consumers may be exposed to pesticide and other chemical residues when they inhaled cannabis smoke. The authors noted that in 2009 the Los Angeles City Attorney’s office had tested medical samples available in California dispensaries and found two of the three samples they tested had extremely high levels of bifenthrin, a chemical used in pesticides. Further, the study found that recovery of pesticides in unfiltered smoking media such as glass pipes and water pipes ranged from 69.5% to 42.2%. Recovery from filtered water pipes was significantly lower – only .08% to 10.9%.

Substantial Litigation Risks For A “Growth” Industry?

As more states allow the legal use of cannabis, the state regulatory agencies are beginning to consider regulations for the industry. Inevitably, this leads to questions as to how existing state and federal environmental laws may apply to plants and their associated fertilizers, pesticides and growth agents. As a result, many producers of legal marijuana may be forced to guess what products may work on their crops, what products are safe when marijuana is smoked, what products are safe on plants ingested in foods, as well as what – if any – warnings may be required when their products are sold. At the same time, emerging businesses in the fledgling industry will likely find themselves beset by the same kinds of toxic tort litigation faced by other manufacturers, including pharmaceutical companies, for various alleged injuries as well as failure to warn of those potential injuries. Thus, as the LivWell case demonstrates, more claims for toxic injury may be on the horizon as the industry grows.

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