California Court of Appeal Reverses $10.6M Asbestos Verdict on “Sophisticated User” Grounds

A California appellate court has affirmed the sophisticated user defense and applied it to an asbestos plaintiff who was the owner/operator of a garage subject to OSHA and thus chargeable with knowledge of asbestos risks.

In Watts v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, the three-justice panel reversed a jury verdict that Pneumo Abex LLC should pay more than $10.6 million to the widow of a man who died after developing lung cancer from alleged exposure to asbestos-containing building and automotive products. The panel determined that the Alameda County Superior Court trial judge had erred in granting a directed verdict against Abex’s affirmative defense that the man was a “sophisticated user” who was already aware of the risks of asbestos. It was up to the jury to decide this issue given that the decedent owned an automotive repair business from 1983 to 2005 and thus was required to know about and abide by government warnings about the risks of working with brakes containing asbestos.

Abex presented evidence that Mr. Watts knew in the early 1980s that brakes were made of asbestos and that compressed air should not be used to blow out brake dust. Further, Mr. Watts admitted that he had not looked at manufacturer manuals or warnings because he believed he knew enough about fixing and inspecting brakes.

Nevertheless, the trial court granted the plaintiffs a directed verdict on Abex’s affirmative defense of sophisticated user. Ultimately, the jury found Abex 60% at fault, awarding the plaintiffs $2.9 million in economic damages, $6.75 million in non-economic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium.

The Court of Appeal did not agree with the trial court and found that there was in fact substantial evidence to support Abex’s sophisticated defense. For example, by the time Mr. Watts opened his shop in 1983, both state and federal entities began to regulate the handling of asbestos-containing parts. Additionally, Mr. Watts had “admitted in his testimony in his brother’s lawsuit that he knew that the brakes contained asbestos.” He further admitted that he “avoided using compressed air because he did not want to fill the air with dust, as dust could be dangerous.”  The Court of Appeal concluded that a jury could infer that Mr. Watts knew about the dangers of asbestos in brakes, especially due to his training and position as an owner of an auto repair shop.

The panel concluded that Mr. Watts’ training and ownership of the automotive repair shop made him a member of a professional class and required him to know about and abide by government warnings regarding how to work with asbestos-containing brakes. Mr. Watts should have known, the panel said. Mr. Watts’ own admission that “he felt he was sufficiently proficient and knew to professionally and safely perform brakes jobs that he didn’t need to consult” manuals, proved that he was in fact a sophisticated user. 

While the decision does not explicitly state that a sophisticated user finding was necessary in this case, it reaffirms that there was sufficient evidence for the issue to be decided by a jury rather than through a directed verdict. The panel remanded the case for a new trial.

Contact the authors or a member of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani’s Environment/Toxic Tort Practice Group with any questions about this legal update or other asbestos legal developments.

New York Appellate Courts Clarify Defense-Friendly Standards on Causation

Recently, New York’s highest court and the intermediary appellate court (Appellate Division: First Department) that hears all appeals arising from New York City’s Asbestos Litigation (“NYCAL”) have ruled that it is a plaintiff’s burden to present evidence of (1) what base line exposure is necessary to cause disease; and (2) that the exposure experienced from each product reached, or exceeded, that level sufficient to cause the disease. Furthermore, common assertions by plaintiff experts like “no safe dose” and “all asbestos is dangerous” were ruled not sufficient to meet this burden.

These were set out in decision of New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, in Nemeth, which set aside a jury verdict (and in which our firm submitted an amicus brief).

Although we have recognized that in any given case it may be “difficult, if not impossible, to quantify a plaintiff’s past exposure” to a toxin (Sean R., 26 NY3d at 812), our standard itself is not “impossible” for plaintiffs to meet (dissenting op at 25). We must, as always, strike a balance between the need to exclude “unreliable or speculative information” as to causation with our obligation to ensure that we have not set “an insurmountable standard that would effectively deprive toxic tort plaintiffs of their day in court” (Parker, 7 NY3d at 447). The requirement that plaintiff establish, using expert testimony based on generally accepted methodologies, sufficient exposure to a toxin to cause the claimed illness strikes the appropriate balance (see Cornell, 22 NY3d at 784). The fault here is not in our standard, but in plaintiff’s proof.

Nemeth v. Brenntag N. Am., No. 24, 2022 WL 1217464, at *1 (N.Y. Apr. 26, 2022)

In Olsen, the First Department set aside one of the most massive NYCAL jury awards to date: after remittitur, $15 million in compensatory damages and $105 million in punitive damages. The First Department held that plaintiffs failed, as a matter of law, to carry their burden to establish sufficient exposure to defendant’s talc product to cause plaintiff’s mesothelioma.

Even if it is assumed that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support their mineral expert’s estimate of the amount of asbestos to which plaintiff Donna Olson was exposed each time she used J & J’s talcum powder products, plaintiffs’ medical expert never set forth a scientific expression of the minimum lifetime exposure to asbestos that would have been sufficient to cause mesothelioma, the disease in question.

Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.(Olsen), No. 14875, 2022 WL 2812015, at *1 (1st Dept. 2022).

Olsen was the first NYCAL verdict overturned on appeal following Nemeth. However, the First Department did not stop there. It issued three more decisions clarifying and extending Nemeth to motions for summary judgment—contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument throughout New York that Nemeth applied only to post-verdict rulings.

All three cases involved claimants diagnosed with lung cancer who alleged asbestos exposure from Amtico floor tiles. The court confronted the same argument and experts on causation in each case.

In reversing the lower court’s denial of defendant’s motions for summary judgment, the First Department held that defendant made out a prima facie case that plaintiffs were not exposed to sufficient quantities of respirable asbestos from defendant’s product to cause their disease, based on a 2007 simulation study showing that cutting, scoring and disruption of its floor tile did not produce sufficient airborne asbestos above ambient levels to cause the disease.

The court held that plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact by failing to provide any quantification and merely arguing “no safe” levels:

Dr. Ginsburg generally concludes that “[t]here is no safe minimum level of exposure to asbestos with respect to lung cancer” and that “manipulation of asbestos containing floor tiles can result in release of asbestos fibers into the workers’ environment that are exponentially greater than the ambient level of exposure.” He also states that the asbestos process releases “visible dust” and that such dust is “certainly in dangerous concentration.” However, Nemeth holds that such broad pronouncements and conclusions will not satisfy a plaintiff’s causation burden, which is to show the levels of asbestos that the plaintiff was exposed to and that the levels are known to cause lung cancer. Likewise, to the extent Dr. Ginsberg’s [sic] conclusions are based upon the presence of visible dust emanating from an asbestos-containing product, this theory fails to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden on causation in asbestos cases. Id.

Dyer v. Amchem Prod. Inc., No. 13739, 2022 WL 2811995, at *1 (1st Dept. 2022).

The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that defense-funded experiments invalidates their conclusions, particularly given that “[p]laintiff offered no expert to counter ABI’s calculation of decedent’s cumulative lifetime exposure, and thus no question of fact was raised as to its validity.” Killian v. A.C. & S., Inc., (Grunert), No. 114345/02, 2022 WL 2812016, at *1 (1st Dept. 2022). Although Dr. Ginsberg pointed to simulation studies measuring an average level of airborne asbestos as high as 0.27 f/cc from floor tile work, the court held that he did not provide any correlation between the asbestos fiber levels to which plaintiff may have been exposed and the amount of inhaled asbestos that would have caused decedent’s lung cancer. Pomponi v. A.O. Smith Water Prod. Co., No. 14982, 2022 WL 2811997, at *1 (1st Dept. 2022).

In each of these four cases, the First Department made clear that a plaintiff cannot establish his or her burden at trial or summary judgment (after defendant meets its initial prima facie burden), by relying on the generalized expert opinions that exposure to a toxin is “excessive” or “far more” than others and, therefore, sufficient to cause a disease. The court needs to be presented with actual quantification of the level of asbestos exposure need to cause the disease at issue and that plaintiff’s inhalation of asbestos from defendant’s product met or surpassed that level.

Plaintiff Experts Can Now Change Stories between Deposition and Summary Judgment?

It just got tougher to pin a California plaintiff’s expert down at deposition.

Generally, a witness cannot give a declaration opposing summary judgment that is inconsistent with prior discovery responses (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1), and an expert witness cannot testify beyond the opinions offered at deposition (Jones v. Moore (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 557, 565 [“When an expert deponent testifies as to specific opinions and affirmatively states those are the only opinions he intends to offer at trial, it would be grossly unfair and prejudicial to permit the expert to offer additional opinions at trial.”]).

A recent California decision throws both those principles into question. Harris v. Tomas Dee Engineering Co. ruled that an expert’s declaration advancing a new theory was not only admissible, but created a factual issue that required reversing summary judgment to the defendant.

The new theory was on a key issue in the case: whether the decedent was ever exposed to asbestos from the defendant’s activities. At deposition, industrial hygienist William Ewing testified, “If he wasn’t present when the work was done, then I don’t think there’d be any issue regarding any exposure.” When plaintiffs were confronted with a potentially fatal motion for summary judgment based on this testimony, however, the expert backtracked. He provided a declaration opining that Mr. Harris “did not need to be present at the exact time that the insulation block was being removed, swept up, and/or installed by Thomas [Dee] workers to be exposed.” Why? Because of the theory of re-entrainment. “This cycle of re-suspension is well-documented and is generally accepted in the industrial hygiene field.”

The trial court rejected the new opinion as contradictory, and granted summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed. It ruled that the Jones v. Moore bar applied to an expert’s trial testimony, but not to testimony on summary judgment. This is contrary to Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 541-543, where the Supreme Court held that the same evidentiary standards apply on summary judgment and trial. Harris does not mention Perry.

Harris also ruled that D’Amico was more limited than many defense counsel suppose, and did not bar the changed testimony. The Court of Appeal distinguished D’Amico as involving factual assertions by a party. “In contrast, in the present case, Mr. Ewing’s declaration relates a scientific theory that he apparently did not discuss in his deposition, and his statements in the declaration do not contradict any prior testimony regarding facts he observed.” Further, he explained the difference “by referencing the re-entrainment theory, which he stated is widely accepted in the scientific community.” The court distinguished cases where no explanation was offered.

Harris provides several important takeaways for defense counsel. 

First, the case underscores the importance of asking the right questions of expert witnesses at deposition, ensuring that the opinions are clearly stated, and clearly stated to be the only opinions the expert has to offer.   

Second, noticeably absent from the discussion in Harris was the adequacy of plaintiff’s expert witness declaration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210.  Had the defense focused on the adequacy of the expert witness declaration – e.g., whether it actually advanced the re-entrainment opinion –  instead of “contradictory testimony,” the result may have been different. 

Third,  rather than focus on excluding contradictory opinions at summary judgment, the prudent defense lawyer should focus examination at deposition on foundation for an expert’s opinions, and then assert evidentiary objections to those opinions at the summary judgment phase. 

Fourth,  Harris calls into question whether any strategy to lock down an expert witness can be 100% effective, or whether a plaintiff expert can always advance a new theory if it is “out there” in the literature. There are still concrete steps that counsel can take.

GRSM Attorneys Publish Article Urging Alternative Exposure Defense

In a recent article for Mealey’s Litigation Report, Dallas partner James Lowery and associate Ted Yarbrough explain why defense of asbestos and talcum powder cases requires exploring alternative exposures. The article focuses on why alternative exposure minimizes the potential liability of each defendant, and how the alternative exposure case needs to be developed at all stages of litigation – from plaintiff’s deposition (the real first day of trial) up through trial.

Mr. Lowery and Mr. Yarbrough argue it is essential that defendants show exposure to more serious types of asbestos found in the amphibole asbestos containing found in the products of the bankruptcy trusts – such as Johns Manville and Thermobestos – as well as exposure in the Navy, from smoking cigarettes, and in the average residential home. This article can be an invaluable guide in minimizing a defendant’s exposure in high risk asbestos and talcum powder cases.

Women’s Lunch at Perrin National Asbestos Litigation Conference

Beverly Bond
Stephanie Jones
Women’s Lunch at Perrin National Asbestos Litigation Conference

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 27 · 12:15 P.M.
THE FAIRMONT SAN FRANCISCO HOTEL

Join hosts Beverly Bond and Stephanie Jones
at the Women’s Lunch as part of the
Perrin National Asbestos Litigation Conference.

We look forward to seeing you there!

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A Return to the Hotel California: Out of State Plaintiffs Must Bring Their Causation “Baggage” With Them

Out of state plaintiffs flock to California courts to take advantage of its laws, including its more relaxed causation standard for asbestos injuries. However, a recent California appellate decision highlighted the fact a plaintiff may not evade the application of his own state’s causation standard when his asbestos exposure occurred entirely in that state – notwithstanding a California venue.1

Swanson v. The Marley-Wylain Company held the trial court erred by permitting a causation instruction based on California law, when Michigan’s causation standard properly applied. Swanson involved a Michigan-based plumber who, from 1969 to 1976, was allegedly exposed to asbestos while working on boilers manufactured by a Marley-Waylain (“MW”) subsidiary. He moved to California in 1979, was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2014, and filed suit in California for his injury. Swanson’s exposure to MW’s product took place entirely in the state of Michigan, and given there was conflict between Michigan’s stronger “but for” standard of proximate cause test and California’s “substantial factor” test, MW asked the trial court to order Michigan’s causation standard applied. Although the trial court denied MW’s motion, the Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate ordering Michigan’s causation law applied. The case proceeded to trial. Plaintiffs persuaded the court to issue a jury instruction setting forth California’s substantial factor test; the trial court ultimately instructed the jury the plaintiff “may meet the burden of proving exposure to defendant’s product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing cancer.” The jury returned a verdict against MW.

On appeal, MW argued the jury had been improperly instructed under California law, and there was insufficient evidence under Michigan law of a causal link between plaintiff’s exposure and his disease. Although the court found the causation evidence could have been sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under Michigan law, it found that the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury on California’s “substantial factor” test and reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for retrial.

The Swanson decision is important for multiple reasons, particularly its affirmation that the location of a plaintiff’s exposure properly frames the applicable causation standard. Even the fact that plaintiff moved to California in 1979 and was a California resident for 35 years before his diagnosis did not compel a different result. California law requires an issue by issue and defendant by defendant choice of law analysis. When, as here, such analysis mandates the application of out-of-state law, a plaintiff may not bypass that mandate with creatively fashioned jury instructions, or through a court’s prejudicial error by so instructing a jury.

The key takeaway for those defending California cases with plaintiffs whose exposure took place entirely out of state is to evaluate and seek to apply the causation standard of the locus of exposure. Even when a plaintiff is a California resident, the “issue by issue” evaluation process mandates application of the causation standard from the state where the exposure occurred.
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1 This follows on the heels of other California cases seeking to rein in forum shopping by enterprising plaintiff’s lawyers, such as this one which sought to limit the use of “nominal” or “sham” defendants to defeat forum non conveniens motions.

California highlights burden on defendants seeking to apportion liability to co-defendants and non-parties

A California Court of Appeal has rejected a defense challenge that the defendant was assigned too high a percentage of liability (60%), because the defendant did not introduce enough evidence about other parties’ liability. The court also rejected a defense claim that the $25 million noneconomic damage award was excessive, even though it was “well beyond the normal range of awards in similar cases for similar injuries” per a survey of similar verdicts.

Phipps v. Copeland Corporation LLC was an asbestos personal injury case in which plaintiff alleged that his mesothelioma resulted from asbestos exposure during his three years in the U.S. Navy and during his subsequent career as an HVAC technician. Copeland Corporation was one of four compressor manufacturers plaintiff sued by plaintiff, along with many other defendants. Plaintiff proceeded to verdict against Copeland only.

Although plaintiff’s medical and causation experts acknowledged during trial at all of plaintiff’s asbestos exposures contributed to his overall dose, they specifically (and expectedly) amplified the exposures to the asbestos-containing gaskets contained within Copeland’s compressors in an effort to maximize Copeland’s share.

The jury found for plaintiff, and ultimately apportioned 60% liability to Copeland, of 15 parties and nonparties on the verdict form. Copeland argued that the evidence could not support “assigning twenty times more fault to Copeland than to any of the other compressor manufacturers, and more fault than all other entities combined.”

The court, however, disagreed. “[A]s the party with the burden to establish the percentage of comparative fault attributable to others [citations omitted], Copeland, to obtain a reversal, must show the evidence compelled a verdict in its favor on apportionment as a matter of law.” Copeland argued that the apportionment was “illogical” because it found Copeland more responsible than any other compressor companies. However, the court pointed out there was no evidence “to compel a finding that William replaced fewer Copeland gaskets than he did Carrier, Trane, or York gaskets.” In reaching this conclusion, the court found that there were sufficient, uncontroverted facts to establish that plaintiff would have worked with far fewer asbestos-containing components from the other equipment manufacturers than from Copeland. In the court’s view, Copeland failed to proffer sufficient evidence of the frequency, intensity and duration of plaintiff’s exposure to the products of other defendants, including the HVAC defendants, and so could not show that the jury’s 60% liability finding was improper.

“The second reason Copeland has failed to demonstrate the evidence compelled a verdict in its favor on apportionment as a matter of law is that ‘the jury was permitted to consider the relative culpability of the parties in assessing comparative fault.’” That culpability need not rise to the level of that required for punitive damages, as here the defense had won summary adjudication nixing punitive damages from the case.

Copeland also argued that the noneconomic damages award was excessive. In support, Copeland submitted to the trial court “a spreadsheet labeled “Plaintiff Verdict Amounts in Asbestos/Mesothelioma Cases.” An accompanying declaration explained that the spreadsheet was the result of “a process for obtaining comparative verdicts in cases that, similar to this one, involved allegations of asbestos exposure leading to mesothelioma,” based on “Lexis Advance® Verdict Analyzer.” Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal was moved by this use of technology.

“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Copeland’s survey of awards in other cases because, if for no other reason, sections 657 and 658 prohibited the court from considering such material:” the statutes require motions to be made on “the minutes of the court.” Accordingly, and because the award was supported by substantial evidence, the judgment and denial of new trial was affirmed.

This case serves as a critical cautionary tale to defendants at trial of the importance of introducing evidence of the liability of others. While California’s Proposition 51 imposes several liability only for non-economic damages, the burden of proving these “alternate shares” lies exclusively with the defendant. The Phipps court made clear that, in its discretion, Copeland simply did not do enough to make a showing that the jury’s apportionment of responsibility was improper. In light of Phipps, a defendant should consider introducing evidence such as:

  • Quantitative assessments of the likely doses of asbestos from the products of others and any possible exposures from one’s own products, including dose reconstructions from experts when possible;
  • Medical causation evidence regarding the relative carcinogeneity of fiber type; and
  • Documentary, “hard” evidence of a co-defendant’s liabilities.

When there are multiple defendants at trial, the plaintiff will make some of this case. Where, as here, there is only a single defendant, this will be more onerous and time-consuming.

Iowa Court of Appeals Bars Claims Against Asbestos Defendants for Products Made or Sold by Third Parties

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s decision that Iowa’s Section 686B.7(5), enacted in 2017, barred claims against a premises owner and installer of asbestos products. The statute provides: “A defendant in an asbestos action or silica action shall not be liable for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.

In Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., decedent worked many years inside an asbestos-containing aluminum plant. Decedent’s family brought asbestos-related claims against premises owner Alcoa Inc. and insulation contractor Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc. Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing that Section 686B.7(5) provided them immunity.

The District Court focused on whether the asbestos-containing insulation used at the premise and any component parts were “made or sold by a third party.” The court noted that the premises defendant never manufactured, produced, or sold an asbestos-containing product or component part, it was merely a consumer of asbestos insulation provided by a third party (the insulation contractor). And while the insulation contractor sold products containing asbestos, the insulation contractor purchased these asbestos products from other sources. Because any asbestos-containing products the insulation contractor installed at the premise or sold to the premise were products or component parts made or sold by third parties, Section 686(B).7(5) granted the defendants immunity, and the court dismissed the claims against them.

On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court misinterpreted Section 686(B).7(5).

First, Plaintiffs argued that the word “defendant” in Section 686(B).7(5) does not mean “any entity sued in an asbestos suit,” but rather “one that makes or sells an asbestos product.” The court disagreed, holding that the words of Section 686(B).7(5) show the legislature’s clear intention to limit asbestos litigation by immunizing a substantial range of defendants, not all of whom manufacture anything.

Plaintiffs next argued that Section 686(B).7(5) established a “bare metal defense,” a common defense raised by manufacturers of equipment that used asbestos, and that because the bare metal defense applies to product manufacturers, the district court should have interpreted Section 686(B).7(5) to only protect product manufacturers. The court disagreed, holding that the immunity available under Section 686(B).7(5) is not the same as that available under “bare metal” defenses, and that if the legislature intended merely to codify the common law defenses, it would have so stated.

Plaintiffs also argued that Section 686(B).7(5) should only apply to product manufacturers because, under the district court’s interpretation, Section 686(B).7(5) would eliminate the liability of premises owners and product suppliers, and interpretation that is “absurd in the extreme.” The court disagreed, pointing out that Section 686(B).7(5) did not create a general grant of immunity for either group. The court further held that it saw nothing absurd with asbestos litigation refocusing on culpable targets, such as asbestos manufacturers.

Full disclosure: GRSM’s Beverly Bond served as national counsel for Alcoa in this matter.

While this decision is welcome news for many asbestos defendants in Iowa, the debate over the bare metal defense’s viability remains alive and well at the state court level in other jurisdictions as we advance into 2021.

EPA Draft Risk Assessment on Asbestos Flawed and could be Problematic for Automotive Friction Defendants

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is currently conducting a chemical risk evaluation of asbestos. The EPA’s 310-page Draft Risk Evaluation for Asbestos (the “Draft”) identified risks for a variety of potential asbestos exposures. The Draft found that acceptable cancer risks were exceeded for much work with automotive brakes and clutches. If these findings are adopted in the final evaluation, defendants can expect asbestos plaintiffs’ counsel to trumpet the evaluation to juries, even though (as described below and detailed in the attached article) the analysis is flawed and inconsistent with both the scientific literature and legal standards regarding cancer causation.

The Draft looked at exposures to occupational mechanics, bystanders, and do-it-yourself mechanics. The only asbestos fiber type the EPA evaluated was commercial chrysotile, and the only potential causative diseases the EPA evaluated were mesothelioma and lung cancer. The EPA chose to evaluate acceptable cancer risks to individuals based on an Inhalation Unit Risk of 0.16 per fiber/cc.

The Draft found that acceptable cancer risks were exceeded for brake and clutch installation and removal for occupational mechanics at both high-end and central tendency exposure levels and for occupational non-users at all high-end levels. For brake repair and replacement performed indoors with compressed air, the Draft found that acceptable risk levels were exceeded for do-it-yourself mechanics and bystanders of do-it-yourself mechanics at high-end and central tendency levels. For brake work performed outdoors, the Draft found that acceptable risks levels were exceeded for do-it-yourself mechanics at high-end tendency levels when mechanic work was performed 30 minutes per day with 62 years of cumulative exposure starting at age 16. Contact the best Asbestos testing in Edmonton and get your issue fixed now.

While the final risk assessment has not been published, the conclusions found in the current Draft lead to concern that these findings will cause confusion or even improperly influence jurors in future asbestos trials. A finding by the EPA that working with and around asbestos-containing brakes and clutches leads to an unacceptable risk of mesothelioma and lung cancer would be used in the opening statements of every asbestos plaintiffs’ attorney in the country. Although the assessment is based on many assumptions that are not realistic, excludes large swaths of relevant scientific and medical studies, and makes conclusions regarding cancer causation that are entirely out of line with all current legal standards, it would be complicated and difficult to explain in necessary detail to a jury. It would simply be another factoid that will be used to persuade jurors that there is no safe level of chrysotile asbestos exposure and that all exposures cause disease. Surely, many hours of drafting and many tons of ink will be spilt in attempts to keep the findings of the EPA out of the courtroom through pre-trial motions to exclude and motions in limine. This is a future that will soon become all too real if there are not considerable changes made between the current Draft and the EPA’s final risk evaluation.

Proposed Changes to California Asbestos Jury Instructions on Causation

The Advisory Committee on California Civil Jury Instructions is considering changes to many instructions, including two on causation: CACI 435 (substantial factor in asbestos cases) and CACI 430 (substantial factor generally).

CACI 430, applicable in tort actions generally, defines “substantial factor” as “more than a remote or trivial factor” in contributing to the harm, which “does not have to be the only cause of the harm.”

CACI 435 is modeled on Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, and provides that the “substantial factor” is not to be determined by causing harm, but a substantial factor contributing to plaintiff’s “risk of developing cancer.”

Two issues are addressed by the proposed changes: (1) whether CACI 435 applies to defendants other than manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos-containing products, such as property owners or those doing work at a site, and (2) whether in some asbestos cases the more traditional, cause-of-harm CACI 430 may be used. In case you still have asbestos in your building and will like to avoid healthy and legal problems, hire the san jose mold inspection to asses the damage and work to be done.

The proposed changes would answer both in ways that help plaintiffs, and expand liability risk for some defendants. First, the proposed changes to CACI 435 will add “property” and “operations” to “product” as a possible source of asbestos exposure. The proposal cites Lopez v. The Hillshire Brands Co. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 679, 688, which ruled that CACI 435 was proper for claims against an employer/premises owner for asbestos at the site, even though not a manufacturer or supplier but rather a user of the product. Lopez reasoned that the point of CACI 435 was to focus on the risk of developing cancer from asbestos, and that the same considerations applied whether or not the defendant was a product manufacturer. Further, Lopez ruled that CACI No. 430’s terms “remote and trivial” are misleading and may confuse jurors: “jury instructions therefore should not suggest that a long latency period … precludes an otherwise sufficient asbestos claim.” The concern seems misplaced: there is no reason to assume jurors are incapable of understanding the concept of latency.

The proposed changes build on Lopez and would not only extend CACI 435 to non-manufacturers, but would drop from the “directions for use” contrary authority, and a reference that the issue was “was not settled.” Potentially worse, they would assert that CACI 430 may never be given in an asbestos case, whether or not in conjunction with CACI 435.

Complicating the problem: even the existing CACI 435 does not faithfully reflect Rutherford, which addresses “a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff or decedent inhaled or ingested” (emphasis in original). The existing instruction refers to a substantial factor contributing to the risk of cancer, without grounding that medical opinion (as did Rutherford) in comparative dose. The difference is particularly significant for defendants with minimal or low-dose exposure in cases where there is abundant alternative exposure (e.g., one home remodel job but a lifetime career working near asbestos insulation). GRSM and other defense attorneys have attempted in vain to get this instruction to reflect its source authority.

The proposals and directions for public comment are at https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/caci20-02.pdf. Comments are due September 2, 2020. Pending that comment period, the changes are due to become effective November 15, 2020.